scripting individuals (of other species or our
own) for medical research. I am in agreement
with what Nelson is aiming to accomplish in this
paper, and in large part with the details. My comments are intended to focus attention on some
areas which I found either particularly
provocative or in need of clarification. In particular, I shall focus on the problem of utilitarian
calculations, the concept of exemplary research,
and finally on conscription.
Utilitarian Calculations
Nelson correctly points out that a utilitarian
reading of diabetes research will be enormously
difficult if it is serious: any kind of accurate comparison of utilities in this case must tackle such
difficult problems as that of making interspecific
comparisons of utilities. In lieu of the ability to
adequately calculate, he considers it not irresponsible to conclude that research on diabetes
is justified by the consequences. But nothing may
be concluded from this, for there is still a serious
question of the fairness of the distribution of
burdens and benefits of diabetes research, i.e., of
the adequacy of act utilitarianism.
I wonder whether we should be so sanguine
about such a judgment that research is justified
by utilitarianism. If we accept the inaccessibility
of cautious comparisons of utilities it seems more
appropriate to argue that appeal to such benefits
should not be used in justifYing research, especially since appeals to benefits without
accounting for costs and for whether they shall
be distributed fairly do not justifY actions.
In clarifYing the utilitarian situation Nelson
accepts the point that the proper unit for analysis
is not the particular research project but "the
whole institution." Though he does not explain
why this is an appropriate shift, I suspect it may
relate to the problem of serendipity, since Fox
and McCloskey, for example, make this shift for
that reason (Fox, 193-43; McCloskey, 66). Useful
results may be stumbled upon in the context of
looking for something altogether different, or
some general information about physiological
processes may turn out to have unforeseen relevance to a later advance. Ifwe cannot predict the
importance of research beforehand, then utilities

Comment on James Nelson's
IIAnimals in 'Exemplary'
Medical Research:
Diabetes as a Case Studyll
Lawrence Finsen
University of Redlands
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we might identifY the hard cases of animal experimentation and draw preliminary conclusions
about the ethics of such experimentation. Mter
identifYing conditions for research to be "exemplary" and arguing that research concerning diabetes mellitus is reasonably viewed as exemplary
research, he considers how such research might
be regarded from both utilitarian and non utilitarian stances. Most of his attention is focused on
nonutilitarian approaches, and some valuable
insights are offered concerning the conditions
under which we might be morally justified in con-
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U

to encourage regeneration of insulin-producing
cells) or perhaps something in between? Even
intuitive utilitarian conclusions require a clear
sense of what the relevant facts are.

ntil animals become
members of our

The Concept of Exemplary Research

community in more meaningful

The idea of exemplary medical research is
important: it is clear that the central and
toughest ethical issue resides in the kind of case
Nelson wants to focus on. Though there is not
universal agreement about the cases of product
testing and the like, these are more peripheral to
the hard questions that critics of using animals
for human benefit must face. Surely it is in the
use of animals in research we might call "exemplary" that a justification may be found for using
animals as resources or tools, if one is to be
found anywhere.
Should we accept that diabetes is exemplary
research? Nelson defines exemplary research as
research that targets widespread, debilitating diseases, has an admirable track record in using
animals to aid in our understanding and management of the disease, and is conducted
according to humane standards as they are currently understood. He offers the discovery of
insulin as indicating the successful track record
of diabetes animal research.
One might wish to raise questions about the
historical claims made on behalf of the discovery
of insulin through animal research, as for
example Dr. Robert Sharpe has (Sharpe, 21-68).
Claims on behalf of animal research are sometimes overblown by proponents. For example,
while chemical therapies and vaccines have
enabled many people to avoid contracting a
number of infectious diseases, such as whooping
cough, measles, and tuberculosis, mortality from
these diseases was already in serious decline
(perhaps due to public health measures - especially improved sanitation) before the
widespread introduction of such vaccines and
therapies. In some cases only a very small percentage of the reduction in mortality rates for
such diseases is attributable to vaccines and therapies. Clearly, we should not conclude too
quickly that improved health today is primarily
attributable to the results of animal research. A

senses than simply serving our
needs and interests, the
justification for conscription
looks more like the
enslavement of an outsider than
the unfortunate but necessary
conscription of one of our own
community.

cannot be calculated on a case by case basis. Of
course, we might say retrospectively that research
was or was not beneficial, but our judgment must
be prospective if ethical reflection is to help us
decide what to do.
Should we shift to the "whole institution" of
research as the proper unit of analysis in order to
solve this problem? Does this include all medical
research or just that research concerned with
diabetes? Nelson's comment that we need to consider "the en tire stream of research that flows
into and out of [Banting and Best's] work with
all its reefs and obstructions" suggests that he has
in mind something narrower than all of medical
research. But how narrow, and how will it be
selected? Is it the entire history of diabetes
research, a particular research program targeting
one kind of diabetes problem (such as attempts
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different had animal experimentation not been
considered a possibility. Obviously, this is an
enormously difficult claim to assess.
Nelson's attempt to identify the notion of
exemplary medical research can help us understand the failure of such prudential arguments to
settle the question of the advisability of animal
research. While there are cases of less than exemplary research, and while public health policies
and preven tive medicine do deserve great
attention - perhaps more than they receive now
(after all, shouldn't it give us some pause to have
heard that the mortality rate of black insulindependent diabetics is twice that for whites?) - it
does not follow from a purely prudential standpoint that all other approaches ought to be abandoned. That there are cases of ~exemplary
medical research" would cut to the heart of the
prudence objection, because these would be cases
where it is imprudent to neglect such research. As
difficult as it may be to obtain agreement on such
moral questions, Nelson's approach seems to me
to be the more responsible one.

stronger conclusion drawn by some is that it is in
our own interest to abandon animal research in
favor of much greater emphasis on preventive
medicine, public health measures, and improved
sanitation. Clearly, if it were in our best interest
to do so, one would not have to argue the difficult and controversial moral case, and this
seems preferable.
In the case of diabetes the point, if it can be
made at all, cannot be put so dramatically.
Diabetes is not an infectious disease, and so
improved sanitation does not have the impact
that it might have on infectious diseases. Further,
while human clinical trials and autopsies played
an important part in understanding diabetes,
much of the story preceding the discovery of
insulin involved the use of animal models. For
example, consider Robert Sharpe's claim that
animal research could have been discarded
because today we know from comparison of diabetic patients and non diabetics that maturity
onset diabetes is often controllable with diet.
What is presumably needed is more public education, not more animal research (Sharpe, 1734). I believe this is a dangerous argument. Even if
dietary advice is sufficient, the question must still
be asked, how do we know what diet to recommend? A few years prior to the discovery of
insulin, Frederick Allen showed that the then
standard dietary approach to diabetes, relying on
control of carbohydrate intake, was mistaken.
Instead, Allen argued, it was the overall caloric
intake that was overburdening the diabetic's
system. Thus, Allen developed diets designed to
find the balance between overburdening the
system and starving the patient. In historical fact,
Allen's initial research involved dogs who had
had partial pancreatectomies and ultimately led
to trials with patients, some of whom died of the
cure (Bliss, 34). This prudential argument might
have more merit were it possible to show that
Allen could have obtained his results without the
use of both animal and human subjects. Such
counterfactuals are at minimum difficult to
assess. In fairness, we should make a shift (analogous to the one discussed concerning the
proper unit of utilitarian analysis) to something
more institutional than Allen's own beliefs: we
need to consider how science might have been
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BB rat's performance is much better, but I still
would want to know what proposals relate to it
and how it indicates their promise.
Another reason I would hesitate to consider
the entirety of diabetes research as exemplary is
that there are portions of it which were scientifically questionable in their design. For example,
once the role of the pancreas in diabetes was
evident, it became important to ask how the pancreas regulated sugar metabolism - was the
absence of pancreatic juices the key to diabetes?
Minkowski and von Mering's work in 1889
seemed to confirm observations of other
researchers who had ligated or cut the ducts
leading from pancreas to duodenum, indicating
that such animals do not become diabetic, but
critics at the time pointed out that ligated ducts
might have been bypassed or replaced by new
ones. It was not until Hedon devised a method of
partial pancreatectomy with relocation of the
remaining portion of the pancreas outside the
skin that the question being asked by Minkowski
and von Mering could be answered. It seems
appropriate to maintain, then, that this particular
study of Minkowski and von Mering should not
be considered exemplary, as it posed questions
which could not be answered suitably given the
techniques employed.
The upshot is that the truly exemplary must
meet a number of conditions Nelson has not
mentioned. I have argued it must be more narrowly defined in its relation to prior successes,
and must pose important questions which have a
reasonable chance of being answered given proposed techniques. There are undoubtedly other
conditions; one might be that it must not target
conditions which are avoidable (e.g., research
concerning the adverse effects of smoking).2

Beyond the actual track record of diabetes
research, a broader question about the notion of
the exemplary needs to be asked. This concept
applies insofar as research addresses a certain
disease. That is, exemplariness is exemplified by
all diabetes research taken as a class, rather than
a particular research study at one time or a larger
program of which such a study might be part.
That this is Nelson's intention is evident for
three reasons: first, he nowhere specifies a particular project or kind of project as "exemplary";
second, the second condition of the definition
requires that exemplary research itself have an
admirable track record, thus it cannot be limited
to a project not yet undertaken; and third, that
the classification is by disease is again evident
when, in discussing the lessons ofjust war theory
for exemplary research, Nelson says:
Exemplary research's insistence on a
demonstrable record of achievement in
using animal models to ameliorate disease
coheres nicely with the first of [the just war
tradition's conditions] and reinforces the
condition as a selection criterion for the
kinds ofdiseases against which invasive animalbased research might be emplayed.
However, from the fact that a breakthrough in
understanding or managing a disease (such as
the discovery of insulin) occurred through
animal research, it hardly follows without additional assumptions that future animal research is
likely to be beneficial. Nelson acknowledges this
when, despite satisfying the track record condition, he still thinks it appropriate to ask
whether continued diabetes research holds out
much promise of answering significant questions.
And his answer is appropriately given in terms of
much more fine-grained classifications of
research such as the claim that the BB rat has
provided evidence that diabetes is or may be an
autoimmune disease.
This shows that what is needed in focusing the
discussion on exemplary research is a concept of
a class of research broad enough to have a track
record but narrow enough to permit useful inferences concerning the promise of future studies
from truly relevant precedents. The entire history
of diabetes research is not specific enough. The
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Conscription

gated to subject ourselves to invasive, albeit low risk
research for the good of others? Perhaps many
would feel that their connectedness to others in
their community gives them reason enough
without obligation to act on behalf of others; but
isn't this a gift, a departure from the stringency of
obligation? If the situation envisioned were one in
which a truly critical situation - a lifeboat case, if
you will - were to arise, then perhaps we could
argue that our sacrifice is called for by the threat
to the community. That is, of course, the situation
of the conscript in a just war. But the normal situation of medical research is not that of the lifeboat
or a just war. Medical knowledge, rightly
employed, might enable us to live longer and
fuller lives and also enable us to die easier deaths,
assuming we are able to cope with the problems
such advances inevitably create, but it will not
change the fact that we are biological organisms
all of whom are born and all of whom will die.
Providing further medical advances than those
currently enjoyed is a good thing, but whatever
the case for thinking it is owed as an obligation
might be (and this is not often, explained), that
value must be balanced against conscripting
healthy individuals with significant interests at
stake to do the dirty work.
Occasionally defenders of research attempt to
escape criticism by appealing to the oddity of the
fact that our society engages in tremendous
exploitation of animals in pursuit of less serious
and more easily replaceable benefits than those
sought by scientific inquiry. Criticism of scientific
inquiry in such a context seems out of place.
Nelson's argument might be looked at as an
attempt to turn that argument on its head.
Scientists themselves are committed to conscripting animals for communal benefits for which
we only have a right to conscript those who
identify with or at least stand to benefit from such
communal efforts. Until animals become
members of our community in more meaningful
senses than simply serving our needs and
interests, the justification for conscription looks
more like the enslavement of an outsider than the
unfortunate but necessary conscription of one of
our own community. Perhaps one further analogy
would help here: in the case of medical experimentation with prisoners, the problem one faces

Turning to non utilitarian approaches to exemplary research, Nelson argues that even if we
accept the conclusion that some kinds of animals
have moral rights, including the rights to life and
to be free of unnecessary and non-trivial suffering, abolitionism does not follow immediately.
A number of reasons are given, but for the sake
of brevity I will focus on his discussion of conscription. Two analogies are employed in this
context to help illuminate the situation of diabetes research animals: the case of young
children who are offered as subjects by proxies
and the case of military conscription.
In both cases Nelson's primary point is that
such conscription is not always wrong, since the
individuals conscripted are members of a community and should not be conceived apart from
that community. Their good,' in some sense, is a
function of its good. So using young children for
research is not a matter of judging that they
count for less morally, but rather that the
promotion of social good in such cases can also
be understood as promotion of their good.
Nelson has pointed out that these cases are disanalogous with animal research - even exemplary research - because the animals called upon
to sacrifice cannot be considered members of our
community, as we do little to protect their most
basic rights, which shows that the identification of
individual and social good is absent. I would add
that there is a further condition on research with
children that is important to bear in mind if that
case is considered analogous to exemplary animal
research: the regulations covering studies with
more than minimal risk and no direct benefit to
the subject require that the Institutional Review
Board determine that the knowledge sought is of
vital importance and that the risk is not too great
(Brody, 266-7). So, surprisingly enough, the fact
that we conscript children and soldiers will not
justifY us in doing the same with animals, even in
exemplary research.
The case of young children stimulates a point
somewhat at odds with Nelson's treatment. Does it
follow from the fact that we are members of the
community and thus our good is in some sense a
function of the community'S good that we are abli-

FaU 1989

209

Between the species

Comment onJames Nelson ~ "Animals in 'Exemplary' Medical Research"

Letters to the Editors

is the threat of coercion undermining the free
giving of consent; to overcome this objection to
the use of prisoners, scientists would have to show
that certain rights of prisoners outside the experimental situation are not violated. Analogously, to
make the case for conscription of animals, scientists would have to work to protect their rights in
nonscientific contexts.
Exemplary research is research which is most
defensible ethically. Thus attention to the conditions under which research might be exemplary
is a promising route to pursue, though, as I have
argued, the specification of those conditions is
more difficult than appears at first. Once the
moral status of animals as beings with independent value is recognized, the position of
animals in exemplary research is nonetheless, as
Nelson has argued, ethically questionable, especially if we appeal to communal goods or obligations to the community to justify conscription.

Dear Editors:
The identification of my name under my article
"What A Jew Should Do," in BTS, Summer, 1989, with
the organization Jews for Jesus, struck me with the
same hilarity Mark Twain felt reading his obituary in a
newspaper. His response became memorable: "Reports
of my death have been wildly exaggerated." I wish I
could match that. My response will have to remain
standard, though it has an historical resonance:
I am not now, nor have I ever been, a member of or
associated with Jews for Jesus. My organization is Jews
for Animal Rights. Our goals and methods are traditional and available to all Jews.
- Roberta Kalechofsky
Jews for Animal Rights
The Editors sincerely regret the foregoing error.
A Re.vly To My Critics

The nastiness of Professor Schwartz and a serious
misunderstanding on the part of Ms. Kalechofsky do
not inspire one to want to reply. I fear, however, that if
I say nothing, readers will be left with the impression
that I am unable to defend myself. Reluctantly, I begin.
It is true that I thought Schwartz was a "reform"
Jew but my article was not, as Ms. Kalechofsky claims,
based on the premise that Schwartz is "reform" and
Rabbi Bleich "orthodox." Much of my piece sketches a
history of the development of doctrine and it is during
that sketch that I try to make clear my basic premises,
which are as follows. Devout Jews need nothing more
than the Torah if they are intelligent as well as devout.
I painted a picture of the growth of the Mishnah and
Talmudic scholarship as the effort of certain Jews to
usurp the right of '1ay" Jews to think for themselves. I
drew an analogy with certain Catholic prohibitions
upon "laymen," circa 1000 C.E., not to read the Bible.
Implicit in my paper is the idea that there is no
injunction in the Torah itself to take the Mishnah and
Talmud as more holy or about as holy as Torah itself. I
presented excerpts from classical "sages" that strike
the unprejudiced Jew who has no axe to grind as
absurdities on their face. Example: that we may torture
a dead kings horse as a way of paying respect to him.
As a philosopher, I am committed to the idea that
people are only free when they stop slavishly accepting
the opinions of "greater persons" and think every
important issue through for themselves.

"Pastoral"
Chickens don't scratch in the yard;
their world is a crowded cell.
No need to peck at anything,
they haven't any beaks.
Sow is immobilized for life;
she's a living breakfast machine.
The horses stand like statues of bone,
with icicles on their hooves.
Cow is full of penicillin;
her baby's in a small, dark crate.
There is no Old MacDonald,
just a corporate plan for Hell.

-

Kathleen Malley

ConlinuLd 0/1 Page 241. ..

Between the Species

210

Fall 1989

